Meloni’s government had taken the lead of a coalition of european countries that had asked the Eu Commission to change its strategy toward the Damascus regime, with the aim of reducing the migratory pressure from Syria to Europe
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Just three days before the rebels entered Damascus and Bashar al-Assad boarded a plane to flee to Moscow, the Italian government offered its “full support” to the Syrian regime, highlighting “how important Russia’s support for Damascus is at this moment.” The dispatch, signed by the regime’s intelligence chief, Hussam Luqa, was found among the piles of documents hastily abandoned in the security services building in Damascus. The camera of a crew from the British newspaper The Independent, which had entered the building, accidentally lingered on one of these documents, and the revelation, in black and white, of the covert ties between Rome and the Syrian regime was entirely fortuitous. Suhail al Ghazi, a Syrian researcher, noticed the images, became suspicious, and carefully read the still frame of the document caught by the camera: “I received a call from General Giovanni Caravelli, head of the Italian intelligence services (at his request), who emphasized his country’s support for Syria in this difficult moment. He explained how important Russian support is for Syria at this time,” the report reads. The document is dated December 5, “just four days after the bombing of a Christian school in Aleppo,” as al Ghazi pointed out, and a few hours before the regime’s fall.
The close ties between Italian intelligence services and the Damascus regime were reported by Il Foglio last September, gathering evidence that confirmed persistent rumors of a visit by our spies to the Syrian government, which has been sanctioned by the United Nations, the EU, and the United States. In May, a delegation from Rome traveled to the Syrian capital to meet with Luqa and Assad. The talks focused on negotiations with the regime regarding the future of sanctions, which the dictator sought to ease in exchange for efforts to ensure the return of Syrian refugees who had fled to Lebanon and Europe over the years.
The feasibility of this plan to repatriate refugees to Syria, while ensuring their safety, was complicated by the ongoing civil war and the constant human rights violations by the Syrian regime, certified by UN investigative bodies. Despite all of this, over the past year, our government has taken the lead of a coalition of European countries – Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus – which requested that the EU Commission change its strategy toward the Damascus regime with the aim of reducing the migratory pressure from Syria to Europe. To this end, these countries had also “recruited” the support of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, which was supposed to ensure the safety of returning refugees in Syria. Between July and September, Italy reopened its embassy in Syria – the only country to do so among the G7 and EU members – abandoned the UN Human Rights Core Group, which monitored Assad’s violations, and obtained the (still unofficial) appointment of a special EU envoy to Syria.
Although it raised eyebrows that the Italian government was engaging in diplomatic relations with a regime sanctioned by the international community and allied with Russia, the discovery of this document in Assad’s intelligence headquarters reveals an even more serious scenario, as Italian support for the regime was expressed when its hold on power was already severely compromised – December 5 is the day the rebels captured Hama, opening the way to Homs and then Damascus. “While Assad’s sudden surrender caught many analysts, experts, and governments around the world by surprise, Italy’s stance was a strategic error,” explains Arturo Varvelli, director of the Italian branch of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Our country approaches relations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean primarily from the perspective of resolving migration issues, underestimating other open issues, some of which are even more strategic.”
Even more surprising is that General Caravelli explicitly referred to the “importance” of Russia’s role, against which Italy is fighting in Europe by siding with Ukraine. “It is astonishing to see how the issue of relations with Moscow is not perceived as a significant threat to our actions in the Mediterranean – Varvelli adds – but is instead seen as a relationship that must always be maintained, regardless of the fact that the Russians represent a serious threat to Italian and European security, even in the Mediterranean.”
During these transitional days, Russia is negotiating with Islamist rebels to determine what to do with its fleet and planes stationed in Tartus and Latakia. In recent hours, the idea of a withdrawal from the country has become more plausible, and flights between Syria and Libya, considered the most viable alternative in the Mediterranean, have increased, likely to transport men and equipment to a safer location – but dangerously closer to Italy. For Varvelli, “if this happens, we will face another problem, and we will need to start considering Russia as a threat to our country as well, abandoning the illusion of keeping a door open for them.”
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Sono nato a Latina nel 1985. Sangue siciliano. Per dimenticare Littoria sono fuggito a Venezia per giocare a fare il marinaio alla scuola militare “Morosini”. Laurea in Scienze internazionali e diplomatiche a Gorizia. Ho vissuto a Damasco per studiare arabo. Nel 2012 sono andato in Egitto e ho iniziato a scrivere di Medio Oriente e immigrazione come freelance. Dal 2014 lavoro al Foglio.