



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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June 30, 2026

FINAL REPORT

The Secret Service Missed Opportunities to Prevent and Disrupt the Attempted Assassination of President Trump on July 13, 2024 (REDACTED)





DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

The Secret Service Missed Opportunities to Prevent and Disrupt the Attempted Assassination of President Trump on July 13, 2024

June 30, 2026

Why We Did This Review

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Crooks shot eight times at President Trump, killing one event attendee and wounding President Trump and others. Although other entities have reviewed the July 13, 2024 event, we initiated this review to holistically evaluate the Secret Service's process for securing that campaign event. We interviewed 92 individuals; received more than 70,000 documents; and created a 3D model to reconstruct the event site and identify individuals' locations before, during, and after the shooting. As a result, we found information about the Secret Service and the event that has not been reported previously.


What We Recommend




We made seven recommendations to improve the Secret Service's processes for securing events.

OIG Access

Secret Service provided timely responses to requests and did not deny or delay access.

What We Found

The Secret Service missed multiple opportunities to detect, prevent, and disrupt Thomas Crooks' attempted assassination of then-former President Donald J. Trump (President Trump) during the [July 13, 2024 campaign event](#).  We found that the Secret Service failed to:

- [detect Crooks' drone flight](#)  that he used to view the campaign event stage due to an under-trained operator and equipment malfunction;
- **warn President Trump's protective detail that Crooks had a range finder, a long gun, and had climbed onto the American Glass Research International complex's roof**, because Secret Service [did not establish a joint communications room](#)  with local law enforcement thereby not receiving many communications regarding the suspicious person;
- share intelligence about a long-distance threat to President Trump with the Pittsburgh Field Office leadership or the lead and site agents, resulting in **insufficient personnel** for the event;
- **secure the area outside the perimeter**, despite the Pennsylvania State Police sharing its plan with the Secret Service that showed this area would be unsecure; and
- [use available resources to block line of sight](#)  from the American Glass Research International complex to President Trump, despite identifying this line of sight as a concern.

The Secret Service's overall lack of policy and processes coupled with limited intelligence sharing and poor collaboration and communication with protectee staff and state and local law enforcement set the conditions that led to missing opportunities to prevent and detect the attempted assassination.

Secret Service Response

Secret Service concurred with all seven of our recommendations. We consider recommendations 1, 4, and 6 resolved and closed and recommendations 2, 3, 5, and 7 resolved and open.



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Abbreviations

AGR	American Glass Research International
ASD	Aviation and Airspace Security Division
DTD	Donald Trump Protective Division
DoW	Department of War
ESU	Emergency Services Unit
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration



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HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
OPO	Office of Protective Operations
PID	Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division
PSP	Pennsylvania State Police
TSD	Technical Security Division
U.S.C.	United States Code



Background

On July 13, 2024, then-former President Donald J. Trump (President Trump) attended a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The date of the event was announced on July 3, 2024, and in the days that followed, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) assigned personnel; coordinated with Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners; and generally followed standard processes to identify and implement measures to protect President Trump during the event. Despite these efforts, while President Trump was speaking, Thomas Crooks, a would-be assassin, fired eight shots from the roof of a nearby building at President Trump, grazing him, wounding others, and killing one spectator.

We initiated this review to evaluate the Secret Service's process for securing the July 13, 2024 campaign event. This is one of several reviews we initiated after the July 13 event examining various aspects of the Secret Service's protective operations.¹ We continue to examine information about the July 13 event and may issue additional reports with findings in the future.

The Secret Service

Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service is charged with two distinct missions: protecting the Nation's leaders and safeguarding the financial infrastructure of the United States.² Concerning its protective mission, the agency is responsible for protecting the President of the United States and his family, the Vice President and his family, former Presidents and their spouses, major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates,³ and select foreign dignitaries.⁴

The Secret Service's Office of Protective Operations (OPO) identifies threats, mitigates vulnerabilities, creates secure environments for protectees, and oversees Secret Service policy for protective operations.⁵ OPO assigns staff to divisions tasked with protecting each protectee (protective division). OPO's Donald Trump Protective Division (DTD) protected President Trump

¹ Two months later, on September 15, 2024, another would-be assassin aimed a firearm at President Trump on a golf course in West Palm Beach, Florida. A Secret Service agent fired on the gunman, who fled and was later arrested by local law enforcement.

² The Secret Service has primary jurisdiction to investigate threats against protectees. It also investigates financial crimes, credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud, computer fraud, identity fraud, and other crimes affecting federally insured financial institutions.

³ 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 3056(a). The Secretary of Homeland Security determines who qualifies as a major Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate in consultation with congressional leaders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7).

⁴ 18 U.S.C. §§ 3056(a)(5)-(6).

⁵ *OPO-01: Office of Protective Operations Functions*, Protective Operations Manual, Secret Service Directives System, June 26, 2023. DHS OIG is conducting a separate audit of Secret Service's protective operations.



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and his family when we initiated this review in July 2024.⁶ See Appendix C for a description of additional Secret Service offices and divisions.

As part of its protective measures, the Secret Service secures events attended by protectees. It does so by:

- assigning personnel in specialized roles to various tasks at the event, such as magnetometer operators and counter snipers (described in Table 1);
- requesting assistance from Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies;
- conducting physical protective measures, including blocking lines of sight to the protectee;⁷
- using technological protective measures, such as counter drone systems to detect drones and drone operators, or using drones to conduct surveillance; and
- establishing a communications room to share information, including threats.

Assigning personnel

The protectee’s staff, not the Secret Service, manages the protectee’s schedule. For example, during the 2024 presidential campaign, President Trump’s staff informed the Secret Service when and where the candidate would attend campaign events. When a protectee’s staff informs Secret Service that the protectee will attend an event, Secret Service determines which of its personnel will oversee the event’s security. The Secret Service protective division and a field office responsible for the event (typically the field office with jurisdiction over the visit) then select:

- a lead agent to oversee security at all locations the protectee will visit during the event, such as the airport tarmac and the event site;
- a site agent to assist the lead agent by planning security at one location, such as the event site; and
- a site agent counterpart to assist the site agent.

⁶ DTD was based in Palm Beach, Florida, and protected President Trump and certain family members at their Mar-a-Lago, FL residence; Bedminster, NJ residence; and other locations protectees visited. When President Trump became president again in January 2025, OPO transferred DTD staff to the Presidential Protective Division.

⁷ The Secret Service’s protective mission includes using countermeasures to deter, minimize, and respond to identified threats and vulnerabilities; providing airspace security, counter surveillance, medical emergency response, hazardous agent mitigation and magnetometer capabilities; providing protection from threats, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and explosive devices; and performing advance work and threat assessments to identify potential risks to protectees. See <https://www.secretservice.gov/protection>.



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Developing a site security plan

The lead and site agents work together to oversee the security of the event. This includes determining the event’s security perimeter, which separates the area inside the event where the Secret Service screens event attendees and the area outside the event with the unscreened public. After visiting the site and conducting walkthroughs to assess vulnerabilities, the agents create a written site security plan with responsibilities for securing areas inside and outside the perimeter. Table 1 gives examples of personnel and roles.

Table 1. Examples of Specialized Roles for Secret Service Personnel Securing Events

Role	Responsibility
Magnetometer operators	screen event attendees by monitoring magnetometers, which are metal detectors people walk through, and searching their belongings
Post standers	stand at a post or designated location to control access and prevent unauthorized personnel from entering restricted areas
Counter snipers	identify potential hostile actors, monitor suspicious activity, and are prepared to neutralize threats from a distance
Counter surveillance members	covertly patrol the area outside the perimeter and search for suspicious individuals
Counter drone system operators	identify the locations of drones and drone operators and disable drones
Counter assault team members	respond to organized attacks or other emergency situations targeting the protectee
Protective intelligence agents	interview suspicious persons and unauthorized drone operators
Communications room members	receive and disseminate information, including reports about suspicious activity, via radio, phone calls, and texts
Protective detail members	physically shield the protectee and may remove the protectee from an event in response to threats

Source: DHS OIG analysis of Secret Service documents

At least one supervisor reviews and approves the site security plan. This may include the field office’s Special Agent in Charge or their designee, and depending on the protective division, the protective division operations supervisor. On behalf of the lead and site agents, a logistics official in the protective division’s operations section submits requests for these personnel to



OPO Staffing and Logistics, which then channels them to the appropriate division or group for review.⁸

Requesting Federal, state, and local law enforcement agency assistance

During presidential campaigns and other events, when the Secret Service lacks sufficient personnel to protect all protectees and secure all events, the Secret Service requests support from other Federal agencies or Departments. For example, the Secret Service may ask other DHS components, such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to assign agents as post standers,⁹ or the Department of War (DoW)¹⁰ to provide explosive disposal technicians, who inspect the site for explosives.¹¹ The number and type of Federal assistance differ for each event. A Secret Service Special Agent in Charge who oversees OPO personnel requests stated that the Secret Service “can’t get by without” assistance from other Federal agencies.

The Secret Service also coordinates with state and local law enforcement agencies to secure areas inside and outside the perimeter. While planning the event’s security, the lead agent provides state and local law enforcement agencies with an overview of the visit and the site agent discusses with them the number of officers needed to secure the area outside the perimeter.¹² Additionally, the lead and site agents conduct a walkthrough of the event site with state and local law enforcement to determine the officers’ placement. If warranted, the Secret Service’s lead counter sniper coordinates with and determines the locations of state and local law enforcement snipers. Inside the perimeter, the Secret Service generally pairs a local law

⁸ There may be several competing requests for personnel, including presidential campaign events, the Republican or Democratic National Convention, or the United Nations General Assembly. Personnel from the Counter Assault, Counter Sniper, and Hazardous Agent Mitigation Medical Emergency Response teams are used primarily for the President and Vice President. For requests from other protective divisions, personnel and asset allocation are based on the position or role of the protectee, staffing and asset availability, the nature of the event, and available credible intelligence.

⁹ On August 5, 2024, Secret Service contacted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) requesting [REDACTED] special agents to perform security duties for Secret Service’s protective operations for the 2024 presidential campaign.

¹⁰ Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense uses the secondary title Department of War where the use of such title “does not create confusion with respect to legal, statutory, or international obligations.” *See also* Memorandum from the Secretary of War, “Department of War Secondary Titles” (Oct. 10, 2025).

¹¹ According to the *Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976*, Executive departments and agencies, including DoW, “shall assist the Secret Service in the performance of its duties by providing services, equipment, and facilities on a temporary and reimbursable basis when requested[...].” *Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976*, Pub. L. No. 94-524, Sec. 6; <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-11599/pdf/COMPS-11599.pdf>.

¹² The lead and site agents identify the areas that require security, after which state and local agencies assign manpower.



enforcement officer with the protective intelligence agent and local tactical units with counter assault teams.

Blocking lines of sight

The Secret Service implements physical protective measures to secure protectees during indoor and outdoor events. One such protective measure is to block lines of sight at events to make it more difficult for someone outside the perimeter to shoot at the protectee. Agents may rent equipment with Secret Service funding or use equipment already at the event to block line of sight. Although Secret Service agents are responsible for the protectee's security, protectee staff organize the event. Beyond selecting the event location and schedule, the protectee's staff oversees any physical construction or placement of equipment at the event site, such as a stage. Lead and site agents and their supervisors coordinate with protectee staff during the site event construction. They also discuss line of sight issues with protectee staff while planning the event.¹³ Lead and site agents also confirm that protectee staff setting up the event place the equipment in locations that block the line of sight. Before the event, when site agents brief their supervisors about the security plan, the supervisors may suggest placing equipment in additional locations to block line of sight.

Using counter drone systems

The Secret Service uses counter drone systems to detect the locations of unauthorized drones and drone operators near events.

The Technical Security Division (TSD) oversees counter drone operators trained in operating and troubleshooting counter drone systems. The TSD sends these operators to events upon request when resources are available.¹⁴ Protective divisions may also train their own counter drone operators and assign them to operate counter drone systems at events.

The Secret Service uses different counter drone systems that specialize in either detecting drones (such as [REDACTED]) or disabling drones (such as [REDACTED]) which interfere with electronic frequencies to disable the drone.¹⁵ Figures 1 and 2 provide examples of counter drone systems and a monitor displaying a detected drone.


¹³ During the December 5, 2024 congressional hearing by the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, Acting Director Ronald Rowe stated that the Secret Service may override protectee staff's decisions on how to keep the protectee safe.

¹⁴ After the July 13, 2024 event, the Secret Service created the Aviation and Airspace Security Division (ASD) and transferred TSD's counter drone operations to ASD.


¹⁵ For events, the Secret Service can request that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implement a temporary flight restriction that prohibits aircraft, including unauthorized drones, from flying above and within proximity of the area during a designated timeframe, such as when the protectee is expected to be onsite.



Figures 1 and 2. Counter Drone Systems and Monitor Showing Drone Detection, Observed October 5, 2024



Counter drone systems that detect or disable drones.



A monitor indicating that a counter drone system detected a drone.

Source: DHS OIG photos

During an event, when a counter drone system detects a drone and drone operator's location, the counter drone operator contacts the protective intelligence agent, who responds to the scene, attempts to interview the drone operator, and considers whether to pursue further criminal investigation.

If a counter drone system malfunctions and the counter drone operator cannot fix the problem, the operator coordinates with the system's vendor for technical support. There is no formal Secret Service element that assists counter drone operators with troubleshooting similar to what an IT helpdesk does with computer needs. At most, a counter drone operator needing assistance can contact a counterpart for help.

Establishing a communications room

The Secret Service establishes a communications room, with a representative from Secret Service and Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies at the event, to receive and disseminate information about suspicious activity related to a protectee event. If communications room members receive information about suspicious activity and identify it as a potential threat, they inform the protective detail. If alerted to a potential threat, protective detail members decide whether to relocate the protectee until Secret Service or state or local law



enforcement resolves the concern. Figures 3 and 4 provide examples of a Secret Service communications room during an event.

Figures 3 and 4. Secret Service Communications Room, Observed October 5, 2024




Figure 3

Law enforcement officers monitoring computers and other electronic equipment.




Figure 4

Law enforcement officers viewing a map of the event.

Source: DHS OIG photos

The July 13, 2024 Event


On July 3, 2024, President Trump’s staff emailed the Secret Service that President Trump would visit Butler, Pennsylvania, for a presidential campaign event on July 13, 2024.

On July 5, 2024, the staff informed Secret Service that the event would include approximately 15,000 attendees and occur at the Butler Farm Show grounds, which span over 100 acres and are surrounded by a wooded area and businesses, including the American Glass Research International (AGR) complex. Located north of the Butler Farm Show, the AGR complex consists of connected buildings, parking areas, and grounds. Figure 5 displays an image of the Butler Farm Show grounds and the AGR complex.

Secret Service’s Pittsburgh Field Office selected a lead agent and site agent counterpart, and the DTD selected a site agent, to oversee the event’s security. The lead and site agents determined the event’s perimeter, which included parts of the Butler Farm Show grounds but not the AGR complex.



Figure 5. Satellite Image of Butler Farm Show and AGR Complex



Source: Google Maps (accessed November 14, 2025)

The Secret Service wrote a site security plan and assigned personnel to the event, including magnetometer operators, post standers, counter snipers, a counter drone operator, a protective intelligence agent, a communications room supervisor, and individuals in other roles. Secret Service offices approved all requests for personnel except for the TSD, which denied one request and did not respond to another request for a TSD counter drone operator, who would have assisted DTD's counter drone operator, as discussed below.

According to a Secret Service Special Agent in Charge who oversees OPO personnel requests, the Secret Service lacked available personnel to support the event and therefore requested Federal assistance from DoW and HSI. DoW assigned explosive disposal technicians to inspect the event



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site for explosives, and HSI assigned agents to serve as post standers assisting with preventing unauthorized access to restricted areas inside the perimeter.

Secret Service also requested assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies. From July 8 through the morning of July 13, the Secret Service coordinated with Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), Butler Emergency Services Unit (ESU), Butler Township Police, and other local law enforcement entities to secure the area outside the perimeter—established by the lead and site agents—and to pair with certain Secret Service members, such as the protective intelligence agent, inside the perimeter. Table 2 lists the Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that participated in the July 13, 2024 event.

Table 2. Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement at the July 13, 2024 Event

Federal
Secret Service HSI DoW
State
PSP PSP Troopers Special Emergency Response Team Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations
Local
Local tactical units Butler ESU Beaver County ESU Washington County Regional Special Weapons and Tactics Local law enforcement Allegheny County Butler Township Butler County Sheriff’s Department City of Pittsburgh Moon Township

Source: DHS OIG analysis of Secret Service and state and local law enforcement documents and interviews

Secret Service lead and site agents and other Secret Service members assigned to specialized roles during the event identified lines of sight where potential attackers could shoot at President Trump, set up counter drone equipment to detect drones and drone operators near the event, and established a communications room to receive and disseminate information during the event.



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On the afternoon of July 12, 2024, DTD supervisors arrived at the Butler Farm Show grounds to assess the security preparations and receive a briefing from the site agents. On the evening of July 12, 2024, the lead and site agents virtually briefed the DTD Special Agent in Charge and protective detail members in preparation for their visit to Butler, Pennsylvania, with President Trump the next day.

On July 13, 2024, the DTD Special Agent in Charge and protective detail members traveled with President Trump from Palm Beach, Florida to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and escorted him from the Pittsburgh International Airport to the Butler Farm Show grounds. Figure 6 depicts a virtual three-dimensional (3D) model (see Appendix A) image of the event site and AGR complex, including placement of the stage area where President Trump would speak, the location of magnetometers, and the Secret Service’s communications room.


To view a video of the event site from the 3D model, [click this link.](#) 



Figure 6. 3D Model Image of Event Site and AGR Complex



Source: DHS OIG 3D Model


At approximately 6:11 p.m., Thomas Crooks climbed onto the roof of an AGR complex building and shot eight times at President Trump, wounding him and others, while also killing one event attendee.



Results of Review

Key Finding 1: An Inexperienced Counter Drone Operator and Delayed Technical Support Resulted in a Failure to Detect Crooks' Drone Flight

The Secret Service never detected Crooks' drone flight,¹⁶ its location, or his location while he flew his drone, therefore missing an opportunity to detect and prevent the assassination attempt. Although the Secret Service had an onsite counter drone system on July 13, 2024, it was manned by a single under-trained operator who did not test the system prior to the morning of the event. When the system malfunctioned, the operator spent several hours attempting to resolve the issue, during which time Thomas Crooks completed his almost 9-minute drone flight undetected.

To view a video of the drone flight from the 3D model, [click this link.](#) 

Crooks flew his drone from 3:51 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., while the counter drone system was inoperable.¹⁷ The drone traveled 471 yards from the event stage which its video camera viewed along with the AGR complex's roof from where approximately 2 hours later Crooks shot at President Trump.

According to Secret Service's *Policy and Concept of Operations for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, Secret Service's counter drone systems are used during events to “[d]etect, identify, monitor, and track” the location of unauthorized drones and drone operators, who may use drones to “conduct unauthorized surveillance.”

We found that the only counter drone operator assigned to the July 13, 2024 event was from the DTD because the TSD did not assign any operators. On July 10, Secret Service personnel made two requests to the TSD to assign a counter drone operator to the event, but TSD members denied one request and did not respond to the other:

1. In the first request, a logistics official, submitting personnel requests on behalf of the lead and site agents, emailed a TSD distribution list requesting a TSD counter drone operator, as shown in Figure 7:

¹⁶ Another DTD counter drone operator told us he detected “a very limited number” of drones at President Trump events. He estimated he detected one or two drones within 2 years.


¹⁷ On July 10, 2024, a Special Operations Division Airspace Security Branch official submitted a request to FAA for a temporary flight restriction during the July 13, 2024 event. Later that day, FAA approved a temporary flight restriction over the Butler Farm Show on July 13 from 4:20 p.m. to 6:15 p.m., the expected time that President Trump would be at the event. See Appendix E for more information on this temporary flight restriction.



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Figure 7. Image of Email Requesting TSD Operator



Source: Secret Service document

We found no evidence that TSD members who received these requests responded to the email.

2. In the second request, the lead TSD agent assigned to the event called a TSD member requesting a TSD counter drone operator. The lead TSD agent told us the TSD member denied his request because TSD had already assigned counter drone operators to the Republican National Convention, which occurred from July 15, 2024 to July 18, 2024. We interviewed the TSD’s counter drone program leader, who told us TSD tried “to cover all



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
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outdoor venues” and he “would have probably done that trip” to the July 13, 2024 event himself, but he “was not aware” of the request.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Aviation and Airspace Security Division (ASD) develop and implement a process for submitting counter drone operator request denials for leadership review.

In addition to being the only counter drone operator assigned to the Butler campaign event, the DTD counter drone operator was also less trained than his TSD counterparts, and when the counter drone system malfunctioned during the event day, he could not repair it without assistance. Figure 8 displays a picture of the counter drone system assigned to the July 13, 2024 event.

Figure 8. Counter Drone System Assigned to July 13, 2024 Event



Source: Secret Service document

According to the TSD’s “Course Overview” presentation, TSD counter drone operators receive a training course that includes troubleshooting malfunctioning systems, but DTD officials told us there were no comparable training courses for DTD counter drone operators. The supervisor overseeing DTD’s counter drone operations told us that instead, operators learn by shadowing experienced operators assigned to events. However, the July 13, 2024 event’s operator said he never shadowed anyone before the event. Instead, another operator provided him “informal



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training” on setting up the counter drone system, but no training on troubleshooting. The operator who provided this training said it lasted 20 minutes.¹⁸

Recommendation 2: We recommend ASD create training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems, including training on repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems.

DTD policy also instructs counter drone operators to test the system the day before an event, but the July 13, 2024 event’s DTD counter drone operator told us he was unaware of this instruction. The supervisor overseeing DTD’s counter drone operations said this policy is in a “shared [electronic] drive,” and counter drone operators “could go in” the drive to access the policy, but the supervisor could not provide any evidence he informed the operator of the policy.

Because the operator did not test the system the day before the event, he did not know it was malfunctioning until he tried to turn it on after 10 a.m. the day of the event. Once the operator realized the counter drone was malfunctioning, he contacted the counter drone program leader for assistance. The program leader suggested troubleshooting techniques that did not fix the issue and told the operator to call the counter drone system’s vendor. The operator contacted the vendor several times for technical support, but support was delayed because the vendor has limited staff during the weekend.

- At 12:12 p.m., the operator called the vendor but failed to reach a technical support representative.
- At 1:11 p.m., the operator called the vendor and spoke with a technical support representative, who began troubleshooting the system.
- At 3:04 p.m., the technical support representative emailed the operator stating, “I need to escalate this matter to a specialist to further investigate[...]I’ve marked this matter as high priority[...]but[...]we have limited support during the weekends.”
- Between 3:51 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., Crooks flew his drone.¹⁹ Figure 9 is a 3D model image of Crooks’ drone flying at 102 feet with a view of the event stage as well as the AGR complex

¹⁸ This individual told us inexperienced operators should shadow experienced operators at events. He said if he or another experienced operator assisted the July 13, 2024 event, they would have repaired the system before Crooks’ drone flight.

¹⁹ Earlier in the day, the operator told post standers to look for and report any drone activity, but no one reported seeing a drone during this time.



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roof. Figure 10 is a 3D model image approximating the area where Crooks flew his drone.²⁰

- At approximately 4:20 p.m., the vendor determined that the system’s ethernet cable was broken. Based on information from the vendor, the operator replaced the broken ethernet cable with an ethernet cable from President Trump staff’s audiovisual booth, which fixed the counter drone system.
- At 4:29 p.m., the counter drone operator turned on the counter drone system and began his counter drone detection responsibilities.

Recommendation 3: We recommend ASD coordinate with counter drone vendors to ensure they have sufficient technical support staff available to meet Secret Service protective mission needs.

²⁰ We analyzed Federal Bureau of Investigation documentation to determine the drone’s height and approximate flight area.



Figure 9. 3D Model Image of Crooks' Drone Viewing Both the Campaign Event Stage and the AGR Complex Roof




Source: DHS OIG 3D Model



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Figure 10. 3D Model Image of the Area of Crooks' Drone Flight



Source: DHS OIG 3D Model



Key Finding 2: Communication Failures Prevented Secret Service Members from Recognizing the Urgent Threat and Warning the Protective Detail

Secret Service members did not receive 102 radio transmissions that local law enforcement officers in a separate communications room received concerning an increasingly intense search for a suspicious person. Instead, we found that the Secret Service received only five phone calls and three text messages about Crooks. As a result, Secret Service members did not alert President Trump’s protective detail about concerns of a suspicious person. This is because the Secret Service did not establish a joint communications room with representatives from all law enforcement agencies. Multiple protective detail members said if Secret Service members had informed them of the ongoing search for a suspicious person, they would have protected President Trump by delaying his speech or removing him from the stage.

Figure 11 describes state and local law enforcement’s search for Crooks, of which President Trump’s protective detail members were unaware.

According to Secret Service guidance, including the “Communications” section in Secret Service’s *Protective Operations Manual*,²¹ and Secret Service’s *Protective Communications* training course,²² Secret Service staff during events effectively communicate by:

- establishing a communications room with representatives from state and local law enforcement agencies; and
- using the communications room to share information with Secret Service members at an event.

According to the training material, “[a]s a result of ineffective communication, serious injuries and/or death could occur to” protectees.

²¹ *OPO-08: Communications*, Protective Operations Manual, Secret Service Directives System, April 6, 2021.

²² *Protective Communications*, James J. Rowley Training Center, Secret Service, April 25, 2022.



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Figure 11. Timeline of State and Local Law Enforcement’s Search for a Suspicious Person



Local law enforcement sniper located at the AGR complex texts photos (seen above) of a suspicious person to his team.

Local law enforcement communications room supervisor states on local law enforcement channels he will send someone to search for the suspicious person.

Local law enforcement sniper team members who received texted photos of the suspicious person from the local sniper stationed in the AGR complex begin sharing the photos, which were circulated to the local communications room, PSP troopers, and Secret Service counter sniper.

PSP troopers arrive at the AGR complex to search for the suspicious person.

Local law enforcement officer states on a local law enforcement channel that someone is on the roof.



Local law enforcement officer attempts to climb on the AGR roof, spots the suspicious person, and radios on a local law enforcement channel that the suspicious person has a long gun. Local police officer’s body camera captures his hands on the roof (seen above).

5:38 p.m.

5:42 p.m.

Local law enforcement sniper states on a local law enforcement radio channel that a suspicious person is near the AGR complex with range finder pointed towards the stage.

5:43 p.m.

5:45 p.m.

Local law enforcement communications room supervisor calls a PSP trooper in the Secret Service communications room, who then calls a PSP trooper near the AGR complex to try to locate the suspicious person.

5:45 p.m.

5:45 p.m.

Local law enforcement communications room supervisor and local sheriff’s deputy radio on local law enforcement channels that PSP and local law enforcement are en route to the AGR complex.

6:00 p.m.

6:02 p.m.

Local law enforcement sniper loses sight of the suspicious person and erroneously transmits on a local law enforcement channel that the suspicious person is moving away from the AGR complex.

6:08 p.m.

6:10 p.m.



6:11 p.m.

PSP troopers and local law enforcement officers surround the AGR complex to locate the suspicious person. Local police officer’s body camera captures police car and police officers arriving onsite (seen above).

6:11 p.m.

Suspicious person shoots at President Trump.

Source: DHS OIG analysis of state and local law enforcement records




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Establishing one communications room ensures that law enforcement agencies—each of which is focused on distinct responsibilities during the event—can immediately receive critical information shared by other law enforcement agencies via radio. For example, the Secret Service needs a radio channel to communicate about the protectee’s transportation from the airport to the event. Separately, a local law enforcement agency needs a radio channel to warn about suspicious individuals outside the perimeter. One local law enforcement officer explained that “you can’t put everybody on the same radio channel because that’s chaos.” Instead, representatives from Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies should operate in a joint communications room and share significant information with each other.

Despite the guidance, the Secret Service did not establish a joint communications room with representatives of all law enforcement agencies for the July 13, 2024 event.²³ Instead, Secret Service and PSP members established one communications room in a building by the Butler Farm Show entrance, and local law enforcement officers established a separate communications room in a mobile command center parked on another part of the Butler Farm Show grounds, as depicted in Figures 12, 13, and 14, and Table 3. Based on our analysis and use of 3D modeling software, we determined the two communications rooms to be 257 yards apart.

To view a video depicting the distance between the communications rooms, [click this link](#). 

²³ On September 11, 2024, the Secret Service updated policy to clarify that the lead agent and the leader of the field office with jurisdiction over the event must ensure representatives from state and local law enforcement agencies are in the Secret Service’s communications room.



Figure 12. Building Used for Secret Service’s Communications Room, Observed August 13, 2024



Source: DHS OIG photo

Figure 13. Command Center Used for Local Law Enforcement’s Communications Room



Source: Photo by local law enforcement officer assigned to the July 13, 2024 event



Figure 14. 3D Model Image Showing Communications Rooms in Different Locations



Source: DHS OIG 3D Model



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Table 3. Representation in Communications Rooms

Secret Service communications room
Secret Service
PSP
Butler County Emergency Services
Butler Farm Show staff
Local law enforcement communications room
Butler ESU
Fire Chief
Butler County 911 dispatcher
Butler County Sheriff's Office

Source: DHS OIG analysis of interviews and documents

The Secret Service made no attempt to obtain local law enforcement radios to establish direct communication between the two rooms or to provide Secret Service radios to local law enforcement officers. Instead, PSP provided a PSP radio to the local law enforcement's communications room to establish direct communication, but the PSP radio connectivity was intermittent during the event. Officers in the local law enforcement's communications room could not radio information to the Secret Service and PSP's communications room and could only provide information to the Secret Service and PSP's communications room via calls and texts on their cell phones. As a result, Secret Service members responsible for communicating with President Trump's protective detail did not:

- receive radio transmissions reported to the local law enforcement's communications room²⁴ about an increasingly intense search for a suspicious person;
- recognize an urgent threat existed; and
- alert President Trump's protective detail.

A Secret Service member learned of local law enforcement's plans for a separate communications room the day before but did not ask local law enforcement agencies to change their plans. On July 12, 2024, a PSP supervisor texted the Secret Service's lead agent that local

²⁴ As a result of PSP's intermittent radio connectivity, PSP officers primarily communicated via phone. We do not have evidence that PSP officers located in the area outside the perimeter observed Crooks and reported his suspicious activity via calls or texts to the Secret Service and PSP communications room.



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law enforcement would be in a separate communications room. When we asked about the text, the supervisor confirmed his understanding that local law enforcement would be in the local communications room with the ability to communicate on state police radio with the Secret Service communications room, and that he thought local law enforcement would also be in the Secret Service communications room. The lead agent told us she did not recall the text exchange and was unaware that local law enforcement planned to have a separate communications room “just for them.” On July 13, 2024, several Secret Service members worked in or visited the Secret Service communications room during the event, including the communications room supervisor, the Pittsburgh Field Office Special Agent in Charge and Assistant Special Agent in Charge, site agent, and site agent counterpart, but none raised concerns about the absence of local law enforcement in the communications room.

We asked Secret Service personnel about the absence of local law enforcement in the Secret Service communications room. The Secret Service communications room supervisor told us Secret Service members who planned the event’s security (i.e., the lead and site agents) were responsible for “figuring out what ... state or local assets” to request and “where they’re going to be,” such as in the communications room. He also said that after realizing local law enforcement were in another communications room, “it’s hard to say” whether Secret Service members should have invited them to the Secret Service’s communications room. In contrast, the lead agent said the communications room supervisor was experienced and should have followed up about this on the day of the event. Additionally, the site agent said she checked the communications room, “saw some police presence,” and said, “the entities that needed to be there for communications were there.” She said she did not learn there were two separate communications rooms until after the event.


As a result of the separate communications rooms, Secret Service members did not receive 102 radio transmissions that the local law enforcement’s communications room received about an increasingly intense search for the suspicious person. Instead, personnel in the Secret Service’s communications room received only five phone calls and three text messages about a suspicious person (who was later identified to be Crooks), including that the suspicious person had a range finder; they never received three transmissions from local law enforcement that the suspect on the roof had a long gun. The limited communication regarding the suspicious person, which is depicted in Figure 15, did not create a sense of urgency for Secret Service members to report this information to President Trump’s protective detail.



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Figure 15. Communications about the Search for a Suspicious Person*



*We included transcriptions of radio transmissions that could have increased Secret Service's urgency to notify President Trump's protective detail.

Source: DHS OIG analysis of the Secret Service and local law enforcement records



When the local law enforcement communications room called the Secret Service and PSP communications room warning them of a suspicious person on the AGR complex's roof at 6:09 p.m., the Secret Service communications room supervisor and counter drone operator did not ask for the AGR complex's location. As a result, the Secret Service did not immediately identify it as a risk. The Secret Service communications room supervisor did not recall learning that the suspicious person was on the roof; he told us he delegated communications about the suspicious person to the counter drone operator because it was a "busy time" on Secret Service radios and the counter drone operator was sitting near him and offered to help. Instead of asking local law enforcement personnel for the AGR complex's location, the counter drone operator searched online for it, and was still searching when Crooks fired his first shots.

Ultimately, although members of the local law enforcement communications room were increasingly concerned by the presence of a suspicious individual as early as 5:42 p.m., Secret Service communications room personnel did not identify Crooks as an urgent threat before he fired shots. Moreover, Secret Service decision-makers responsible for protecting President Trump while on stage at the Butler event were not made aware of Crooks' presence at any time.

Recommendation 4: We recommend OPO update policies for planning event security to require communications room staff to inform protective detail about searches for suspicious persons.

Key Finding 3: The Secret Service Did Not Allocate Sufficient Personnel Because of Limited Intelligence Sharing

Based on a threat identified prior to July 13, the Secret Service assigned counter snipers to the event. However, they did not assign additional personnel that could have enhanced the Secret Service's security posture and reduced the outdoor event's vulnerabilities. We found this occurred because of limited intelligence sharing within the Secret Service.

According to the "Protective Advance – Overview" section in Secret Service's *Protective Operations Manual*,²⁵ Secret Service staff must identify "threat information" and "site-specific vulnerabilities," and create "a site security plan that optimizes the use of[...]personnel to[...]provide an appropriately secure environment." In the context of protectee operations, threats and vulnerabilities can be described as follows:

²⁵ *OPO-3: Protective Advance – Overview*, Protective Operations Manual, Secret Service Directives System, March 11, 2024.



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- Threats include actors such as foreign nations or domestic extremist groups planning to harm the protectee. Although some threats are specific to one event, others relate to ongoing plots to target the protectee.
- Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that are specific to the location of the event. For example, outdoor events with long-range line of sight concerns may have more vulnerabilities than indoor events.

On July 3, 2024, Secret Service’s Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) informed the DTD Special Agent in Charge and Deputy Special Agent in Charge that it received classified intelligence pertaining to DTD’s role protecting President Trump.²⁶ On July 8, 2024, PID briefed the Special Agent in Charge and Deputy Special Agent in Charge on this intelligence.

After the briefing, DTD leadership asked a DTD supervisor to request counter snipers at the event based on long-range threat information. The DTD supervisor asked a Secret Service logistics official to submit the request, which was approved by Secret Service’s Special Operations Division. However, DTD leadership did not recommend the DTD supervisor request additional personnel, such as a counter surveillance unit patrolling the area outside the perimeter.

We also found that PID did not request permission from the agency that provided the intelligence to share the threat information with Pittsburgh Field Office leadership, lead and site agents, or the lead counter sniper—each of whom oversaw event security and the protection of President Trump.²⁷ When we interviewed a PID official, she told us she “went through all of [PID’s] manuals[...]and [she] did not see anything specifically written[...]pertain[ing] to how [PID] obtain[s] classified information and disseminate[s] it.” She said PID typically shares relevant intelligence with the lead and site agents for an event, but PID officials could not provide evidence that PID shared the classified threat information with lead and site agents prior to the July 13, 2024 event.

The Pittsburgh Field Office Special Agent in Charge and the site agent counterpart told us they would have requested additional personnel had they received intelligence about a threat. Specifically, the Pittsburgh Field Office Special Agent in Charge said he would have asked for a counter surveillance unit to assess the site’s vulnerabilities, and the counter surveillance unit would have “zeroed in on the AGR” complex.

We found there were other reasons why Secret Service may not have allocated additional personnel to protect President Trump. First, PID wrote a report stating its “[d]ark web” searches

²⁶ The intelligence originated from another Federal agency. PID requested and received permission from the originator to share this information.

²⁷ The lead counter sniper did not know why he was assigned to the event. He incorrectly assumed the lead agent or someone else overseeing the event requested counter snipers because of line of sight concerns.



“yielded negative results” for threats on the internet about the event and sent it to the lead and site agents,²⁸ potentially decreasing lead and site agents’ concerns about possible threats. Second, another PID official described the division’s typical process for sharing intelligence as disseminating intelligence with a field office when there is a threat specific to a location covered by the field office, and PID officials told us their intelligence collection identified no threats specific to Butler, Pennsylvania.

Recommendation 5: We recommend PID develop and implement policy and procedures for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events, and ensuring timely and efficient dissemination of classified intelligence with cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel.

Key Finding 4: Ineffective Coordination with State and Local Law Enforcement Resulted in Failure to Secure the Area Outside the Perimeter

For the July 13, 2024 event, Secret Service lead and site agents did not fully coordinate with or provide feedback to state and local law enforcement partners, particularly regarding securing the area outside the perimeter, which includes the AGR complex. As a result, state and local law enforcement partners did not secure the AGR complex, resulting in a missed opportunity to prevent Crooks from entering the area, climbing onto the AGR complex’s roof, and shooting at President Trump.

According to the “Protective Advance – Overview” section in Secret Service’s *Protective Operations* Manual,²⁹ Secret Service “requires effective coordination and cooperation with[...]state and local” law enforcement agencies to secure events. Effective coordination includes reviewing state and local law enforcement agencies’ plans for events, including instructions for their officers assigned to the events, and providing “comments or clarification, if necessary.” This coordination and feedback is necessary, because although the Secret Service requests assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies, the Secret Service is ultimately “responsible for providing a secure environment at all locations visited by protectees.”³⁰ The “Protective Advance – Overview” policy did not, however, specify that Secret

²⁸ PID sent this report to the lead and site agents on July 8, 2025, the same day that it provided the classified briefing to DTD leadership about a threat.

²⁹ *OPO-3: Protective Advance – Overview*, Protective Operations Manual, Secret Service Directives System, March 11, 2024.

³⁰ *OPO-3: Protective Advance – Overview*, Protective Operations Manual, Secret Service Directives System, March 11, 2024.



Service members should document their review of state and local law enforcement's instructions or confirm state and local law enforcement's positions before an event.³¹

Coordination with PSP

On July 12, 2024, PSP emailed its operations plan for state and local law enforcement officers³² participating in the event to the lead and site agents. The plan provided police officers with information, including expectations on wearing body cameras. It also included instruction on areas to secure outside the perimeter, which did not include securing the AGR complex.

We determined the locations of state and local law enforcement personnel on July 13 based on multiple documents and interviews. Based on our work, we conclude that neither state nor local law enforcement personnel were positioned to prevent access to the AGR complex from nearby roads (see Figure 16).

Although the lead and site agents reviewed the PSP operations plan, they did not provide comments or clarification to PSP. Secret Service personnel provided various explanations why they did not provide feedback on PSP's operations plan, but none appeared consistent with Secret Service policy:


- The lead agent said she briefly looked at the operations plan but had no feedback because state and local law enforcement officers are “not [her] personnel” and she is “not [in] their chain of command.”
- The site agent reviewed the operations plan but also did not have any feedback. She said while providing feedback is “not mandatory,” she did read it but did not notice any issues.
- The site agent counterpart told us she did not read the operations plan because she was too busy with other tasks. The site agent counterpart also said she discussed how to secure the AGR complex during a July 11, 2024 walkthrough with PSP, and PSP agreed to block people from accessing the area. However, a PSP supervisor said this discussion did not occur.

³¹ On April 10, 2025, Secret Service updated its policy stating lead and site agents must request and document their review of state and local law enforcement's plans before an event. The updated policy also requires site agents to confirm state and local law enforcement officers' positions before an event.

³² PSP's operations plan did not include instructions for state or local law enforcement snipers. As discussed in the next section, Butler ESU developed instructions for snipers.



Figure 16. Locations of State and Local Law Enforcement Personnel Near AGR Complex Areas During July 13, 2024 Event



Source: Google Maps (accessed November 14, 2025) and DHS OIG analysis of state and local law enforcement documents

This lack of effective coordination resulted in state and local law enforcement not securing the AGR complex and the Secret Service not recognizing such a coverage gap existed. A PSP supervisor stated he placed officers at every location the Secret Service requested, but Secret Service members did not ask him to place officers at the AGR complex. He said if the Secret Service asked him to place officers there, he would have assigned them to the area.

Coordination with Butler ESU

In addition to missed opportunities to coordinate with PSP, Secret Service also did not coordinate effectively with the Butler ESU regarding placement of its snipers. Specifically, Butler ESU's instructions to its snipers did not include monitoring the area outside the event perimeter



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for threats; they were told to only monitor the area within the event’s perimeter.³³ A Butler ESU supervisor told us this aligns with its snipers’ typical role of searching for threats inside the area where Butler ESU operates.

Butler ESU developed an operations plan documenting which locations to secure during the event, which did not include the AGR complex. However, at the time, Secret Service policy did not require requesting local law enforcement plans from its partners during events. As a result, Secret Service did not request a copy and Butler ESU did not provide it, missing an opportunity to close a coverage gap.

During the July 11, 2024 walkthrough, a Butler ESU supervisor informed the Secret Service personnel that its snipers would only monitor areas within the event perimeter and asked for feedback but did not receive any. Secret Service personnel told us they did not provide feedback on Butler ESU’s instructions. Similar to their statements regarding PSP’s operations plan, they provided various explanations:

- The lead counter sniper said he did not “dictate” what Butler ESU members should do because he “assum[ed] there [was] a reason” for their decision.
- The site agent deferred to the lead counter sniper. She said the lead counter sniper told her he would coordinate with local snipers to “make sure[...]they can have[...]good visibility on everything.”
- The site agent counterpart said she never spoke with Butler ESU members, but if she did, she could have “made sure they[...]understood” how to assist the event, such as acting “as counter snipers” instead of “point[ing] guns at crowds” inside the event.

One of the Butler ESU supervisors said he thought Butler ESU members “wish they [received] more information from the Secret Service on tips on how to do” their protective work because they “looked at [Secret Service members] as the experts.” Ultimately, the Secret Service’s ineffective coordination with both PSP and Butler ESU resulted in missed opportunities to secure the AGR complex and prevent Crooks from entering the area with a rifle.

Recommendation 6: We recommend OPO update its policy on coordination with partner law enforcement agencies to require lead and site agents review and confirm state and local law enforcement’s positions before an event.

³³ Local law enforcement assigned some of their snipers inside one of the buildings in the AGR complex to view the event through the building’s windows, but these snipers did not have any role securing the area outside the event’s perimeter.



Key Finding 5: The Secret Service Did Not Use Available Resources to Block Line of Sight to President Trump

Secret Service did not confirm whether campaign staff had placed equipment that would have blocked line of sight from the AGR complex’s roof to the stage. This gave Crooks an unobstructed line of sight at the distance of 155 yards to the stage after he climbed onto the AGR complex’s roof, allowing him a clear view of President Trump from which to shoot at the podium. Based on our analysis and use of 3D modeling software, we determined the distance between Crooks and President Trump at the time of the shooting, as depicted in Figure 17.


To view a video of the unblocked line of sight, [click this link](#). 

Figure 17. 3D Model Image of Distance Between Crooks and President Trump




Source: DHS OIG 3D Model

Secret Service’s *Site Advance Development* training course³⁴ instructs Secret Service members to place objects in locations that enhance “line of sight coverage” at events. The training course also provides pictures of protectees at prior events and asks Secret Service members to identify line of sight threats. Figure 18 is a picture from this training course.

³⁴ *Site Advance Development*, James J. Rowley Training Center Lesson Plan, Secret Service, March 30, 2022.



Figure 18. Picture from Training Course about Blocking Lines of Sight



Source: Secret Service training document. “U/FOUO/LES” classification strikethrough added by DHS OIG consistent with Secret Service instruction.

Additionally, DTD guidance states:

All available resources should be considered when addressing line of sight mitigation, including armor, barriers, vehicles, tents, banners, flags, jumbo screens, pipe & drape, and bleachers.

Figure 19 illustrates the unblocked line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage at the July 13 event, in contrast with Figure 20, which provides an example where objects—including trucks, bleachers, and a flag—block line of sight during President Trump’s return rally in Butler, Pennsylvania 3 months later.



Figures 19 and 20. Examples of Line of Sight Blockage During Butler Farm Show Events*




Figure 19

DHS OIG 3D model image of the view from the AGR roof to the stage on July 13, 2024, with unblocked line of sight.



Figure 20

The view from the AGR roof to the stage on October 5, 2024, with trucks, bleachers, fence covering, a crane, and the American flag blocking line of sight.

*President Trump returned to the Butler Farm Show for another campaign event on October 5, 2024.

Source: DHS OIG 3D Model and DHS OIG photo during October 5, 2024 campaign event at the Butler Farm Show

In Butler, the Secret Service site agent counterpart proposed blocking line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage where President Trump would be speaking. On July 12, 2024, the site agent counterpart spoke with protectee staff about placing trucks already on location to block the line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage. The site agent counterpart told us she proposed placing the trucks between the AGR complex and the stage, but protectee staff denied the request because the trucks would be “too close to [President Trump’s] press shot.” The site agent counterpart then proposed moving the trucks to a nearby location instead, which would block line of sight from a different area; protectee staff agreed.³⁵ However, the site agent counterpart did not inform the lead agent or her supervisors that the protectee’s staff rejected

³⁵ Ultimately, the lead and site agents did not monitor the protectee staff’s placement of equipment while building the site, and the protectee staff did not place the trucks in this agreed-upon second location. After noticing this issue, they did not discuss it with the protectee staff or notify their supervisors.



her request to place equipment already at the site to block line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage and that the line of sight from the AGR complex would be exposed.³⁶

Additionally, DTD supervisors did not request additional line of sight mitigation because of confusion about protection of the AGR complex's grounds. On the afternoon of July 12, DTD supervisors received the onsite briefing about the security plan from the site agents and noted the site did not include any equipment blocking line of sight from the AGR complex. However, they did not instruct the site agents to confirm protectee staff blocked line of sight from the AGR complex's roof to the stage. We interviewed the supervisors about why they did not request that the line of sight be blocked; they stated that during the onsite briefing, the site agent told them local law enforcement officers would protect the AGR complex's grounds. Therefore, the supervisors were not concerned about someone accessing the AGR complex. As discussed earlier in our report, local law enforcement officers were not planning to block access to the AGR complex.

Regardless of whether Secret Service and local law enforcement officers secure a particular area, training still instructs Secret Service members to place objects to block lines of sight, which in this instance included the AGR complex. At Butler, DTD supervisors instructed site agents to block lines of sight from other locations but failed to instruct site agents to block line of sight from the AGR complex, even though they had already identified it as a concern. For example, the supervisors instructed the site agent to place a tractor in a location that blocked line of sight from a nearby street. During the supervisors' onsite briefing, a supervisor also expressed concerns about the line of sight from a nearby tree to President Trump's walking path to the stage. On July 13, 2024, before the event, the site agent texted the supervisor a picture (see Figure 21) of flags and a crane that had been placed to block this line of sight from the tree to address the supervisor's concerns.

The supervisor responded that it "looks much better," but did not ask about the line of sight from the AGR complex, which was still unobstructed at that point. Based on our analysis and use of 3D modeling software, we were able to approximate Crooks' line of sight at the time of the shooting, as depicted in Figure 22.

Recommendation 7: We recommend OPO develop and implement a process to document the identification and blocking of line of sight vulnerabilities and the approval of mitigation plans before events.

³⁶ On April 10, 2025, the Secret Service issued policy clarifying that Secret Service personnel inform the lead agent or their supervisors when there is a conflict with protectee staff, and the lead agent or supervisors work with protectee staff to find an effective resolution.



Figure 21. Flags and Crane Blocking Line of Sight from Field and Trees



Source: Photo taken by Secret Service site agent and sent to the site agent's supervisor on July 13, 2024, at 11:54 a.m.

Figure 22. 3D Model Image of Unobstructed Line of Sight Between Crooks and President Trump



Source: DHS OIG 3D Model



Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Pub. L. No. 107-296) by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*.

Our review publication was significantly delayed by three government shutdowns in FY 2026 which collectively spanned 7 months of the year, totaling 123 days.

We initiated this review in response to the attempted assassination of President Trump on July 13, 2024, at a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania. Our objective was to evaluate the Secret Service's process for securing President Trump's July 13, 2024 campaign event. We focused on Secret Service's actions until the attempted assassination, and we did not evaluate Secret Service's actions after the shooting.

To meet our objective, we interviewed 92 individuals, including:

- Secret Service members with expertise in securing events with protectees;³⁷
- Secret Service members involved in securing President Trump's July 13, 2024 event;
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis members with expertise in sharing intelligence with the Secret Service;
- HSI and DoW members who assisted Secret Service in securing the event; and
- local law enforcement officers who assisted Secret Service in planning and securing the event.³⁸

DHS OIG teams reviewing the Secret Service received more than 70,000 documents and we reviewed documents related to:

- Secret Service policies, procedures, trainings, and other guidance;
- the role of Secret Service, HSI, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, DoW, and state and local law enforcement members who planned or participated in the event's security operations or shared intelligence about President Trump;

³⁷ Additionally, we attended nine interviews led by auditors conducting two of our other Secret Service reviews, 24-039-AUD-USSS, *U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Preparedness and Operations*, and 24-040-AUD-USSS, *U.S. Secret Service Planning and Implementation Activities for Protective Operations*.

³⁸ We did not interview state law enforcement officers; PSP denied our interview requests.



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- other entities’ review of Secret Service operations during the event, including the Secret Service Inspection Division, DHS Independent Review Panel, and U.S. Congress; and
- Federal and state law enforcement investigations into the event, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and PSP.

We summarize the documents we obtained and reviewed in the below table:

Table 4. Examples of Records We Obtained and Reviewed

Entity	What We Obtained and Reviewed
The Secret Service	Documents Secret Service members created to plan the event’s security, communications by Secret Service members assigned to the event, policies, procedures, trainings, and records from Secret Service’s internal review of its operations during the event.
Office of Intelligence and Analysis	Intelligence and threat assessments related to President Trump and the event.
HSI	Documents HSI received from Secret Service before the event and communications by HSI members assigned to the event.
DoW	Documents DoW received from Secret Service before an event, communications by DoW leadership coordinating DoW assignments for the event and discussing the assassination attempt after the event, and summaries of DoW personnel’s role during the event.
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Summaries of interviews with Secret Service, state, and local law enforcement personnel assigned to the event and records related to Crooks’ drone flight.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives	Records of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ investigation into Crooks’ use of a firearm.
FAA	Records of the flight and airspace restriction in the vicinity of the event.
U.S. Department of Agriculture	Records related to Secret Service’s coordination with U.S. Department of Agriculture members assigned to a facility adjacent to the event site.
State and local law enforcement agencies ³⁹	Operations plans the agencies created to assist Secret Service securing the event, communications by officers assigned to the event, body-worn and vehicle-dashboard video footage by officers assigned to the event, and responses to our written questions about PSP troopers’ actions during the event.

³⁹ We obtained and reviewed records from PSP, Butler Township Police, Butler County ESU, Beaver County ESU, Alleghany County Police Department, Butler County Solicitor’s Office, City of Butler Bureau of Police, Washington Regional Special Weapons and Tactics, and Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.



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DHS' Independent Review Panel	Records from the DHS Independent Review Panel's review of Secret Service's operations during the event, including summaries of interviews with Secret Service, state, and local law enforcement members assigned to the event; documents Secret Service created to plan the event's security; and operations plans state and local law enforcement agencies created to assist Secret Service secure the event.
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Source: DHS OIG analysis of records received

We visited the Butler, Pennsylvania event site on August 13, 2024, to document the locations of Crooks, Secret Service, and state and local law enforcement during the July 13, 2024 event. We visited Butler, Pennsylvania again from September 29, 2024, to October 6, 2024, to observe and document Secret Service planning and implementing security during President Trump's second campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show.

On September 27, 2024, we observed a demonstration of the Protective Threat Management System, Secret Service's system of record for documenting incidents, which contains information about the July 13, 2024 event. On March 10, 2025, we also observed a Federal Bureau of Investigation video simulation of Crooks' drone flight before his attempted assassination.

Additionally, we reviewed:

- hotline complaints related to the Secret Service and the July 13, 2024 event;
- congressional testimony by the Secret Service and state and local law enforcement officers;
- media articles related to the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt; and
- oversight reports related to the July 13, 2024 event, which we summarized in Appendix D.

We created a virtual 3D model to reconstruct the event site and identify individuals' locations before, during, and after the shooting. From March 7 to 9 and June 20 to 22, 2025, we visited the Butler Farm Show and AGR complex and conducted aerial and ground scans of the area. We used this data, interviews with law enforcement who attended the event, and publicly available information to reconstruct the attempted assassination. We created video clips from the model to accompany the report.

We conducted this review under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424, and according to the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.



DHS OIG's Access to DHS Information

During this review, Secret Service provided timely responses to our requests for information and did not deny or delay access to information we requested.



Appendix B: Recommendations, Management Comments, and OIG Analysis

The Secret Service provided management comments on a draft of this report. We included the comments in their entirety in Appendix F. We also received technical comments from the Secret Service on the draft report; we revised the report as appropriate. Secret Service concurred with all seven recommendations. We consider three recommendations resolved and closed and four recommendations resolved and open. A summary of the Secret Service's response to the recommendations and our analysis follows:

Recommendation 1: We recommend ASD develop and implement a process for submitting counter drone operator request denials for leadership review.

ASD Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. In July 2025, ASD developed and implemented a process that addresses this recommendation. Denials of requests for counter drone systems must now be issued by a Secret Service subject matter expert or manager in concurrence with an ASD Chief. ASD communicated this process to its personnel orally in 2025 and in an email in April 2026. Secret Service sent the OIG documentation related to this recommendation and requested the OIG consider it resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. Secret Service provided documentation showing it implemented a process for submitting counter drone operator request denials for ASD leadership review. This recommendation is resolved and closed as implemented.

Recommendation 2: We recommend ASD create training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems, including training on repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems.

ASD Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. In March 2025, ASD created training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems and is incorporating those standards into its policy, which is under review. Once complete, this policy will reference repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems. Estimated completion date: September 30, 2026.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when Secret Service provides finalized training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems, including training on repairing malfunctioning the systems.



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Recommendation 3: We recommend ASD coordinate with counter drone vendors to ensure they have sufficient technical support staff available to meet Secret Service protective mission needs.

ASD Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. ASD stated it regularly coordinates with counter drone vendors to ensure technical support is available. Since July 13, 2024, the Secret Service took action to employ ASD's Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Branch specialists who ensure operators in the field receive timely technical support. Matters that cannot be addressed by the Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Branch are escalated to ASD's Science and Technology Subdivision. The Secret Service requested the OIG consider the recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. ASD stated it regularly coordinates with counter drone vendors to ensure they have available technical support, but our report demonstrates this did not occur during the July 13, 2024 event. ASD also stated it now uses specialists to provide technical support to counter drone operations but did not provide documentation demonstrating this. We will close the recommendation when Secret Service provides documentation supporting it coordinates with vendors to ensure sufficient technical support, or that it uses specialists to provide this technical support instead.

Recommendation 4: We recommend OPO update policies for planning event security to require communications room staff to inform protective detail about searches for suspicious persons.

OPO Response to Recommendation 4: Concur. In May 2026, OPO updated guidance requiring Secret Service personnel assigned to command posts and/or security rooms provide protective details with information regarding significant site security changes or incidents, such as suspicious persons in proximity to a protected site. The Secret Service provided the OIG with documentation related to this recommendation and requested the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. Secret Service provided guidance that assigns responsibilities for event communication. The guidance requires communications room personnel to report any significant changes or incidents related to site security, such as suspicious persons, to the lead agent and protective detail. This recommendation is resolved and closed as implemented.

Recommendation 5: We recommend PID develop and implement policy and procedures for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events, and ensuring timely and efficient dissemination of classified intelligence with cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel.



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PID Response to Recommendation 5: Concur. In February 2026, PID enhanced its practices for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events. The practices give cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel the opportunity to view products downgraded by intelligence partners. When available, unclassified summaries or sanitized sections of highly classified intelligence are shared. PID also created an Advance Support Unit to assist agents with sharing intelligence. Secret Service sent the OIG documentation related to this recommendation and requested the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. Secret Service provided documentation of a process to share unclassified, but not classified, intelligence with cleared, onsite personnel. We will close this recommendation when we receive documentation of a Secret Service process for requesting permission to share and timely and efficiently disseminating classified intelligence with field offices assigned to events.

Recommendation 6: We recommend OPO update its policy on coordination with partner law enforcement agencies to require lead and site agents review and confirm state and local law enforcement's positions before an event.

OPO Response to Recommendation 6: Concur. In April 2025, Secret Service updated its policy to state site agents must coordinate a site orientation with state and local law enforcement officers at their assigned positions before the protectee's arrival and communicate with the site security room when the officers are in their positions. The site agents must also conduct additional orientations for state and local law enforcement shifts in cases of extended operations. Secret Service sent the OIG documentation related to this recommendation and requested the OIG consider it resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis: We consider Secret Service's actions responsive to the recommendation. Secret Service provided updated policies showing it reviews and confirms state and local law enforcement's positions before an event. We consider this recommendation resolved and closed as implemented.

Recommendation 7: We recommend OPO develop and implement a process to document the identification and blocking of line of sight vulnerabilities and the approval of mitigation plans before events.

OPO Response to Recommendation 7: Concur. In February 2026, the Secret Service updated its policy to identify line of sight concerns and eliminate them by manipulating the environment, and/or by using protective assets and personnel. If line of sight concerns cannot be eliminated,



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Secret Service must take measures to mitigate them, document the mitigation measures in the event security plans, and share the plans with Secret Service personnel planning the event.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. Secret Service provided documentation of the process for site agents to document the identification and elimination of line of sight concerns but did not provide evidence of a process for lead agents, supervisors, or others to approve mitigation plans before the event. We will close this recommendation when we receive documentation of the approval process.



Appendix C: Secret Service Offices and Divisions Overview

As previously described, OPO assigns staff to protective divisions. OPO also oversees the Uniformed Division, which screens individuals entering facilities and event sites with protectees; and the Special Operations Division, which provides counter snipers and counter assault teams to respond to emerging threats at events. As of the date of the attempted assassination of President Trump, other Secret Service offices tasked with protection included:

- **The Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information**, which includes PID, which collects intelligence about protectees and disseminates them to Secret Service personnel responsible for protecting them; and the Counter Surveillance Division, which provides counter surveillance teams that covertly patrol the area outside the perimeter of events and search for suspicious individuals;
- **The Office of Technical Development and Mission Support**, which includes TSD that oversees counter drone operators trained in operating and troubleshooting counter drone systems;⁴⁰ and
- **The Office of Investigations**, which conducts investigations and provides field office personnel to OPO's protective assignments.⁴¹

⁴⁰ As previously noted, after the July 13, 2024 event, the Secret Service created ASD and transferred TSD's counter drone operations to ASD.


⁴¹ After the July 13, 2024 event, the Secret Service changed this office's name to the Office of Field Operations.



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Figure 23. Secret Service Offices and Divisions Addressed in This Report*



*Highlighted boxes identify offices and divisions addressed in our report.

Source: DHS OIG analysis of Secret Service document

Secret Service’s *Protective Operations Manual* provides policies and procedures for securing events, including planning event security, securing an event location, and establishing reliable communications for events. Additionally, Secret Service’s James J. Rowley Training Center develops training courses that instruct Secret Service members on how to safeguard protectees and secure events, such as the Introduction to Protection, Site Security, and Protective Communications training courses.



Appendix D: Related Findings by Other Oversight Entities

Other oversight entities reviewed Secret Service’s security operations during the July 13, 2024 event. Although findings in our report include facts not covered by the oversight reports referenced below, these reports have generally identified some similar issues. These reports also identified issues related to Secret Service assigning personnel, coordinating with state and local law enforcement, blocking lines of sight, using counter drone systems, and communicating with the protective detail. We summarize these reports’ related findings below:

[One Year Later: The U.S. Secret Service’s Failures Surrounding the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt](#), U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 2025.⁴²

Assigning personnel: Secret Service members did not share threat intelligence with those responsible for the event’s security.

Law enforcement coordination: The Secret Service and state and local law enforcement lacked coordination from the planning process through the event.

Communication: Secret Service agents failed to communicate crucial information regarding the suspicious individual to President Trump’s protective detail, which had the ability to prevent President Trump from taking the stage.

[Gaps in Policy and Threat Information Sharing Hindered Efforts to Secure 2024 Trump Campaign Rally](#), U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2025.

Assigning personnel: Secret Service personnel did not request assets because of common practices and unclear policy. The Secret Service had no process to share classified threat information with partners when the information is deemed highly classified and a significant threat to security operations, but not considered an imminent threat to life. The Secret Service’s siloed information-sharing practices prevented officials with significant security responsibilities from having access to threat information that could have changed how they secured the area.

Lines of sight: At the time of the event, there were no Secret Service policies or processes in place that required the Secret Service to document changes made to its site security plans, including

⁴² The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released an interim report, [Examination of U.S. Secret Service Planning and Security Failures Related to the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt](#), in September 2024.



line of sight vulnerabilities, based on recommendations received from non-Secret Service personnel.

Counter drone system: The Secret Service did not adhere to policy governing counter drone operations and training.

[Final Report of Findings and Recommendations](#), U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, December 2024.⁴³

Assigning personnel: The Secret Service did not request adequate assets and lacked manpower. Secret Service members did not share threat intelligence with those responsible for the event's security.

Lines of sight: The Secret Service failed to mitigate line of sight from the AGR roof to the stage. Secret Service did not ensure state and local law enforcement secured the AGR complex.

Counter drone system: The Secret Service failed to operate the counter drone system because of limited training for the counter drone operator onsite, a lack of preparedness for technical failures, fragmented counter drone planning for the event, software and physical cable issues, and communications failures.

Communication: The Secret Service and state and local law enforcement lacked collaboration and coordination, which contributed to failures in execution including fragmented communications and separate communications rooms.

[Mission Assurance Inquiry into the Events of July 13, 2024](#), U.S. Secret Service, November 2024.⁴⁴

Law enforcement coordination: The Secret Service did not closely coordinate with state and local law enforcement partners to secure the AGR complex's roof.

Lines of sight: The Secret Service failed to adequately address line of sight issues contributing to President Trump's exposure to the shooter.

⁴³ The U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump released an interim report, [Investigating the Stunning Security Failures on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania](#), in October 2024. Representative Clay Higgins, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, released an [addendum](#) to the Task Force's final report in December 2024.

⁴⁴ Although we summarized findings from Secret Service's publicly available report, Secret Service also issued a separate classified report.



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Communication: Secret Service personnel failed to staff the communications room as planned and according to Secret Service methodology.

[Report of the Independent Review Panel on the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania](#), DHS Independent Review Panel, October 2024.

Law enforcement coordination: The Secret Service's security planning lacked cohesion and integration with state and local law enforcement's security planning leading up to the event.

Lines of sight: The Secret Service and other Federal, state, or local law enforcement did not secure the AGR complex, which resulted in a critical security failure.

Counter drone system: The counter drone operator identified a technical problem with the counter drone system the day of the event and had difficulties diagnosing and remediating it.

Communication: The Secret Service did not inform the leadership of President Trump's protective detail about a suspicious person with a range finder in the vicinity of the AGR complex, and that this person had not been located and at times could not be observed. Secret Service did not establish an adequate process to communicate with local law enforcement.

[Whistleblower Report: Failures of the United States Secret Service in Connection with the Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump](#), Office of U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, September 2024.

Assigning personnel: Secret Service's Counter Surveillance Division did not perform a typical evaluation of the Butler site and was not present on the day of the rally.

[Preliminary Investigative Report to Chairman Mike Kelly](#), Congressman Clay Higgins, August 2024.

Law enforcement coordination: The report includes initial observations about Secret Service's coordination with local law enforcement and states Secret Service was ultimately responsible for the event.

[Preliminary Findings: July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt on Former President Donald Trump](#), U.S. Senator Ron Johnson, July 2024.

Communication: Local law enforcement officers said communications were siloed and they were not in frequent contact directly with the Secret Service. Local law enforcement officers notified



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the local law enforcement communications room about a suspicious person before the shooting and received confirmation that the Secret Service was aware of the notification.



Appendix E: Potential Lapse of Temporary Flight Restriction While President Trump was on Stage

As stated in the Background,⁴⁵ the Secret Service can request that FAA implement a temporary flight restriction that prohibits aircraft, including unauthorized drones, from flying above and within proximity of an area during a designated timeframe, such as when the protectee is expected to be onsite.

On July 10, 2024, the Secret Service requested a temporary flight restriction from 4:20 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. on July 13, 2024, the expected time that President Trump would be at the event, which FAA approved. Any drones in the area during that time without approval from the FAA and the Secret Service were unauthorized, and the Secret Service could act, including through using its counter drone systems. According to Secret Service policy, even without a temporary flight restriction, Secret Service may still use its counter drone system to detect and disable unauthorized drones.

On July 13, 2024, President Trump arrived approximately 1-hour late to the Butler Farm Show grounds and likely would have been speaking on stage when the temporary flight restriction expired. However, President Trump was evacuated from the site at 6:14 p.m. following Crooks' attempted assassination, 1 minute before the temporary flight restriction expired. Without the temporary flight restriction, the use of drones in the area would have been allowed. The Secret Service could still have used its counter drone system to disable drones posing a threat to President Trump, but the decision to disable the drone may not have been as quick as when the temporary flight restriction was in place and all drones were unauthorized, potentially leaving President Trump vulnerable to a drone threat.

⁴⁵ See Footnote 15.



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**Appendix F:
Secret Service Comments on the Draft Report**




U.S. Department of Homeland Security
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Washington, D.C. 20223

BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

May 14, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Sean M. Curran 
Director
United States Secret Service

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: “The Secret Service Missed Opportunities to Prevent and Disrupt the Attempted Assassination of President Trump on July 13, 2024” (Project No. 24-038-ISP-USSS)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

Secret Service leadership is pleased to note OIG’s recognition of the importance of the Secret Service’s mission to identify and implement measures to protect the President and other protectees, and takes seriously the OIG’s findings regarding the factors contributing to the agency’s actions to detect, prevent, and disrupt the attempted assassination of then-former President Trump during the July 13, 2024, campaign event in Butler Pennsylvania. Consequently, since that event the Secret Service made comprehensive enhancements to its communications capabilities, resourcing and protective operations.

Specifically, the Secret Service took diligent and direct action to strengthen protocols, processes, and policies governing protective planning and operations. For example, the agency established a new policy¹ on March 5, 2026, to clarify the lines of accountability and responsibility for protective operations. The Secret Service also dramatically increased its retention and recruiting efforts through advertising, public relations, and monetary recruitment incentives. The Secret Service remains committed to ensuring a safe protective environment for all protectees.

¹ OPO-25, “Protective Operations Accountability,” dated March 5, 2026.



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The draft report contained seven recommendations with which the Secret Service concurs. Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. The Secret Service previously submitted technical comments addressing several accuracy, contextual and other issues under a separate cover for OIG's consideration, as appropriate.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future.

Attachment



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**Attachment: Management Response to Recommendations
Contained in OIG 24-038-ISP-USSS**

OIG recommended the Aviation and Airspace Security Division:

Recommendation 1: Develop and implement a process for submitting counter drone operator request denials for leadership review.

Response: Concur. In July 2025, the Secret Service's Aviation and Airspace Security Division developed and implemented a process for this recommendation. In the event a request for Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems coverage is denied, the denial now must be issued from a senior Secret Service subject matter expert or manager and include concurrence from an Aviation and Airspace Security Division Chief. The Aviation and Airspace Security Division communicated this process orally to all Division personnel when it was first implemented in 2025, and Division leadership also reiterated this process in an email to all Division personnel in April 2026.

On May 7, 2026, Secret Service personnel provided the OIG with documentation of efforts to address this recommendation. We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

Recommendation 2: Create training standards for protective divisions operating counter drone systems, including training on repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems.

Response: Concur. In March 2025, the Aviation and Airspace Security Division created training standards for protective divisions operating Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems, and is presently incorporating those standards into Aviation and Airspace Security Division policy which is under review for operational and legal sufficiency. Once complete, this policy will include references to repairing malfunctioning counter drone systems. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2026.

Recommendation 3: Coordinate with counter drone vendors to ensure they have sufficient technical support staff available to meet Secret Service protective mission needs.

Response: Concur. The Aviation and Airspace Security Division already regularly coordinates with counter drone vendors to ensure technical support is available at all times. Moreover, since July 13, 2024, Secret Service took action to employ specialists within the Aviation and Airspace Security Division's Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Branch who ensure operators in the field receive timely technical support. Matters that cannot be addressed by the Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Branch are



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escalated to the Science and Technology Subdivision, also within the Aviation and Aerospace Security Division, for more substantive support and solutions.

We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG recommended the Office of Protective Operations:

Recommendation 4: Update policies for planning event security to require communications room staff to inform protective detail about searches for suspicious persons.

Response: Concur. On May 4, 2026, the Office of Protective Operations updated the guidance document OPO-08, "Communications," to require that Secret Service personnel assigned to command posts and/or security rooms provide protective details with information regarding any significant changes or incidents related to site security, e.g., suspicious person(s) observed in proximity to a protected site.

On May 7, 2026, Secret Service personnel provided the OIG with documentation of efforts to address this recommendation. We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG recommended the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division:

Recommendation 5: Develop and implement policy and procedures for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events and ensuring timely and efficient dissemination of classified intelligence with cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel.

Response: Concur. In February 2026, the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division enhanced its practices and procedures for receiving and requesting permission to share intelligence with field offices assigned to events. While the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division always shared information affecting field offices assigned to events, new practices were put in place to provide cleared, onsite Secret Service personnel the opportunity to view versions of products that our intelligence partners downgraded for greater dissemination. When available, unclassified tear lines² are shared to ensure the widest possible audience. This practice is two-fold, involving the creation of the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division Advance Support Unit to assist agents in the field with when and how to share intelligence, and greater emphasis

² Unclassified tearlines are sanitized summaries or sections of highly classified intelligence reports that are approved for release to a wider audience, such as local law enforcement, foreign partners, or the general public. They represent the "bottom line" of a report, removing sensitive sources and methods while keeping the core, actionable information.



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on the role Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division supervisors play in determining when downgraded products and tear lines should be requested.

On May 7, 2026, Secret Service personnel provided the OIG with documentation of efforts to address this recommendation. We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG recommended the Office of Protective Operations:

Recommendation 6: Update its policy on coordination with partner law enforcement agencies to require lead and site agents review and confirm state and local law enforcement's positions before an event.

Response: Concur. As of April 10, 2025 OPO-03(01)³ states that, prior to the protectee's arrival and at a time agreed upon during advance planning, site agents will coordinate a site orientation with state and local police at their assigned fixed posts identified during the advance, communicate with the site security room when postings are complete, and conduct additional orientations as needed for extended operations (e.g., multiple shifts). This was also addressed in revisions to OPO-06.⁴

On May 7, 2026, Secret Service personnel provided the OIG with documentation of efforts to address this recommendation. We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

Recommendation 7: Develop and implement a process to document the identification and blocking of line-of-sight vulnerabilities and the approval of mitigation plans before events.

Response: Concur. As of February 27, 2026, OPO-03(02)⁵ addresses identifying line of sight concerns, as well as eliminating those concerns with available environmental manipulation and/or protective assets and personnel. Specifically, if line of sight concerns cannot be eliminated, measures must be made to mitigate them. Further, these elimination and mitigation measures must be documented in advance paperwork and communicated to the Secret Service advance team and partners. This was also addressed in revisions to OPO-06.

On May 7, 2026, Secret Service personnel provided the OIG with documentation of efforts to address this recommendation. We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

³ OPO-03 (01), "State and Local Police Final Site Postings," dated April 10, 2025.

⁴ OPO-06, "Site Security," dated June 30, 2025.

⁵ OPO-03 (02), "Advance Team Guidelines Site Agent," dated February 27, 2026.



Appendix G:

Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to This Report

Seth Winnick, Chief Inspector
Lorraine Eide, Lead Inspector
Gregory Flatow, Lead Inspector
Parnia Asad, Senior Inspector
Stephanie Murguia, Senior Inspector
Sean Peck, Senior Inspector
Carolina Pena, Senior Inspector
Eleanor Sullivan, Senior Inspector
Jocelyn Woodson, Senior Inspector
Anthony Crawford, Intelligence Officer
Zane Hartog, Inspector
Hezekiah Hawkins, Inspector
Roman Novak, Inspector
Dorie Chang, Communications Analyst
Jonathan Ban, Independent Referencer
Melanie Lake, Independent Referencer



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**Appendix H:
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